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I. Introduction
On November 28, 2011, technology blogs heralded the addition of
iTether to the App Store.' For a one-time download fee of $14.99,
the software application ("app") allowed purchasers to use their
smartphone's cellular modem to access the Internet on a laptop
browser or similar device via the iPhone's USB connection.2 Upon
*B.A. Philosophy, 2007, Reed College; J.D. Candidate, 2013, U.C. Hastings College
of the Law. The author would like to thank Dr. Christian E. Mammen of U.C. Hastings
for his thoughtful review and comments to this note, as well as the 2012-13 Comm/Ent
staff.
1. Mark Gurman, Apple Allows Unlimited Tethering iPhone Application into the
App Store, 9TO5 MAC (Nov. 28, 2011, 8:45 PM), http://9to5mac.com/2011/11/28/appleallows-unlimited-tethering-iphone-application-into-the-app-store/.

2. Id.
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release, demand for the app was so great that the company that
developed iTether, 3235106 Nova Scotia Limited, reported adding
twenty additional servers to handle the unexpected uptick in traffic.3
When some customers expressed skepticism about Apple's
willingness to continue hosting iTether, the company reassured its
Twitter followers that it had been "very clear" with Apple regarding
the purpose and capabilities of their app during the lengthy interview
process prior to approval.' However, about twelve hours after the
application was available for download, Apple informed the makers
of iTether that it would immediately cease hosting the application for
download.' The makers of iTether were incensed and released a
statement on their website claiming that Apple's decision to remove
their app was "anticompetitive" and disputing Apple's purported
reasons for the removal.'
The story of iTether is hardly unique. Throughout 2011,
consumers who had previously enjoyed unrestricted use of
independent tethering applications found that major network
providers significantly curtailed their functionality and availability.
Tethering, sometimes called mobile hot-spotting, refers to software
applications that enable devices with cellular modems, typically
smartphones, to serve as an Internet connection for devices without
cellular modems, such as laptop computers.! Tethering applications
are considered independent if third party developers, rather than
network providers, create them.9 In March of 2011, AT&T notified
iPhone customers who were using independent tethering software
that they could either discontinue using the application, modify their
contract with AT&T to include a monthly tethering plan, or continue
using independent tethering applications and face automatic

3. Tether.com, TwITTER (Nov. 29, 2011, 6:16 AM), https://twitter.com/#!/Tethercom/
status/ 141520791895408640.
4. Tether.com, TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:16 PM), https://twitter.com/#!/Tethercom
/status/141415159376781312.
5. Gregg Keizer, iPhone Tethering App Maker Accuses Apply of Bait-and-Switch,
(Nov. 29, 2011, 3:18 PM), COMPUTER WORLD, http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9222246/iPhone-tethering-app makeraccusesApple-of bait and switch.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, Another Tethering App Bites the Dust, GADGETWISE
(Nov. 29, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/anothertethering-app-bites-the-dust/.
8. Id.
9. Keizer, supra note 5.
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enrollment in a tethering plan that charged monthly fees.'0 In May of
2011, Android customers found themselves similarly situated when
Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile all blocked independent tethering
applications from installation on Android devices operating on their
networks." Soon afterward, Verizon removed all such applications
from the Android store entirely,12 prompting a lawsuit from media
reform advocacy group Free Press. 3
These restrictions on tethering applications arose at a time when
policymakers and the telecommunications industry were attempting
to define how providers may restrict customer usage of different types
of online content, applications, or services. 4 At a hearing for the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Mobile Privacy in May 2011,
Sen. John Rockefeller IV (D-WV) conceded that the smartphone app
market was "totally unregulated."" In the absence of congressional
action, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") adopted
an informal policy in 2005 that prohibited fixed broadband access
providers from restricting consumer access to lawful online content,
applications, and services." This policy, colloquially known as a "net
neutrality" or an "Open Internet" policy, embodied the broad
principle that if the content, applications, and services that a
consumer uses neither are unlawful nor unduly interfere with a
Internet Service Provider's ("provider") ability to reasonably manage
network traffic, then the provider may not block access to them or
discriminate against their access in favor of other content." Although
10. Brian X. Chen, AT&T Tells Free Tethering Customers It's Time to Pay Up,
WIRED (Mar. 18, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/03/att-tethering/.
11. Mike Isaac, Carriers Crack Down on Wireless Tethering App for Android,
ARSTECHNICA

(May

3,

2011,

6:50

AM),

http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2011/05/carriers-crack-down-on-wireless-tetheringapp-for-android.ars.

12.

Casey Johnston, Verizon Blocks Unlicensed Tethering, Insists It Can Charge

Extra, ARS TECHNICA

(Aug.

9,

2011,

1:50 PM),

http://arstechnica.com/gadgets

/news/2011/08/verizon-blocking-tethering-customers-may-violate-fcc-rules.ars.
13. Matthew Lasar, Does Net Neutrality Protect Mobile Tethering Apps?, ARS
TECHNICA
(July 6, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2011/07/should-net-neutrality-protect-third-party-mobile-tethering-apps.ars.

14. Cecilia Kang, FCC's Net Neutrality Rules to Trigger Legal, Hill Challenge, POST
TECH (Sept. 13, 2011, 12:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/posttech/post/fccs-net-neutrality-rules-to-trigger-legal-hill-challenge/2011/09/13/gIQALFzPK
blog.html.
15. Declan McCullogh, Senators Press Apple, Google on Location Privacy, CNET
(May 19, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20064395-281.html.
16.

Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline

Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986, 14988 (Aug. 5, 2005).
17.

See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 548 (2010).
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the FCC has recently provided regulations that codify this policy with
regard to fixed Internet connections," many issues remain
unaddressed for mobile broadband.19
This note investigates the regulation of mobile broadband using
tethering applications as an example of how to apply net neutrality
rules. Part II looks at the recent history of the FCC Open Internet
regulations and the rapid advances in the speed, capabilities, and
prevalence of mobile broadband as a primary means of Internet
access. Part III discusses the 2012 settlement reached between
Verizon and the FCC over Verizon's request that Google remove
tethering apps from the Android Store. Following that, Part IV
assesses the merits of the FCC's current approach to enforcing net

neutrality policy via contractual provisions attached to the sale of
blocks of the wireless spectrum at auction. Using the contrasting
examples of iTether and the FCC-Verizon settlement, this note will
argue that the current regulatory regime is ineffective because: (a) the
FCC can only control blocking of mobile tethering apps through
providers subject to wireless spectrum licensing terms (which state
that licensees may not block apps); (b) in most cases, platform
designers (e.g., Apple and Google), not providers, do the actual
blocking by pulling tethering apps from their stores; and (c) therefore,
the FCC cannot control the blocking of tethering apps in most cases.
II. Background
A. The Political History of the FCC's Open Internet Rules

Although many scholars, politicians, and advocacy groups have
called for some form of open Internet rules, the FCC did not make
open Internet a priority prior to the appointment of current FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski in 2009.20 From 2004 to 2009, FCC
broadband policy was limited to preventing fixed broadband
providers from blocking lawful content, applications, and services,

18. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.1-8.17 et seq. (2012).
19. See Dan Terzian, The FCC's Net Neutrality Rules: A Tale of Two Internets, NEW
MEDIA RIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2011, 10:29 AM), http://www.newmediarights.org/net-neutrality
/fccs-net-neutrality _rulestaletwoInternets.
20. See, e.g., John C. Abell, Genachowski Approved as FCC Chairman, WIRED
(June 25, 2009, 11:56 PM), http://www.wired.comlepicenter/2009/06/genachowskiapproved-as-fcc-chairman/ (noting that net neutrality advocacy groups praised
Genachowski's nomination as an indication that the FCC would codify net neutrality
regulations).
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and was enforced on a case-by-case basis.21 Shortly after his Senate
confirmation,22 Chairman Genachowski announced that the FCC
would formalize the policy in a set of rules, which would create two
additional rules for the broadband spectrum: non-discrimination and
transparency. 23 He explained that under the non-discrimination rule,
providers "cannot block or degrade lawful traffic over their networks,
or pick winners by favoring some content or applications over others
in the connection to subscribers' homes." 24 Citing the dynamic and
complicated nature of the Internet, Chairman Genachowski
advocated continuing enforcement of the new rules on a case-by-case
basis. 25
Implementing the rules over political opposition proved difficult.
The FCC voted to draft a framework for Open Internet rules on
September 2010 by a 3-2 vote along partisan lines, with the
commissioners appointed by Democratic administrations voting in
favor and those appointed by Republican administrations voting
against.26 When the FCC issued the initial version of their Open
Internet rules in a report, Commissioners Baker 27 and McDowell 28
each filed dissenting statements arguing that the FCC lacked the
authority necessary to regulate both fixed and mobile broadband
under existing federal law. Both relied extensively on Comcast v.
FCC, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
the FCC had overstepped its ancillary authority when it imposed
network management criteria upon Comcast that interfered with its
ability to restrict customers' use of peer-to-peer file sharing
software. 9
The Open Internet regulations also faced opposition in Congress.
In February 2011, Rep. Greg Walden (R-OR) introduced a resolution
21. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
"Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and
Prosperity" at 4 (Sept. 21, 2009) (transcriptavailable at http://www.fcc.gov/events/speechpreserving-free-and-open-Internet-platform-innovation-opportunity-and-prosperity).
22. Genachowski was confirmed by the Senate on June 29, 2009. Julius
Genachowski,, FCC (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.fcc.gov/leadership/julius-genachowski.
23. Genachowski, supra note 21, at 5-6.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id.
26. Tina Nguyen, FCC: Your Internet Belongs to Us, DAILY CALLER (Sep. 23, 2011,
4:53 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/23/fcc-your-Internet-belongs-to-us/.
27. Federal Communications Commission Record, In the Matter of Preserving the
Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, (FCC Rcd. 10-201) (Dec. 21, 2010)
(dissenting statement of Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker).
28. Id. at 145 (dissenting statement of commissioner Robert M. McDowell).
29. Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (2010).
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disapproving of the FCC order.' Rep. Walden characterized the
regulations as a "power grab" by the FCC, and raised questions about
the FCC's authority to issue them." The resolution passed in the
House on April 15, 2011.32 However, congressional opposition failed
to overturn the regulations after a parallel resolution sponsored by
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) was narrowly rejected in the
Senate by a 52-46 vote." Had the proposed resolution passed,
President Barack Obama threatened to veto any legislative action
that interfered with the regulations.34 Even as the rules went into
effect, numerous private litigants, led by Verizon, filed complaints
against the FCC in federal court.35 The complaints were consolidated
into a lawsuit that, as of the publication date of this note, is pending in
the D.C. Circuit court.36
B. The Rise of Tiered Data Plans

Amid the political debate over the Open Internet rules, the
mobile broadband spectrum saw rapid increases both in popularity
among consumers and in technological capabilities.37 According to
the most recent Cisco industry analysis, during 2012, average
smartphone use grew by 81 percent and average network speed more
than doubled.3 ' This forecast39 concluded that the North American

30. H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011).
31. Grant Gross, House Votes to Strike Down FCC Net Neutrality Rules, PC WORLD
(Apr. 8, 2011 2:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/224771
/housevotesto strikedown fcc netneutrality-rules.html.
32. Brian Hunt, House Passes Resolution Disapprovingof Net Neutrality Rules, REG
BLOG (June 1, 2011), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/06/house-passesresolution-disapproving-of-net-neutrality-rules.html.
33. Abigail Slater, Senate Fails to Overturn the FCC's Net Neutrality Rules, REG
BLOG (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/11/senate-fails-tooverturn-the-fccs-net-neutrality-rules.html.
34. Cecilia Kang, White House Vows to Veto Bill that Overturns Net Neutrality Rules,
POST TECH (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/posttech/post/white-house-vows-to-veto-bill-that-overturns-net-neutrality-rules/2011/11/08/glQ
A3oRQ1M _blog.html?wprss=post-tech.
35. Brief for Appellee/Respondents, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir., Sept.
10, 2012); See also Jasmin Melvin, U.S. FCC Draws Tough Court for Web Rule Lawsuits
REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/usa-Internetrules-idUSN1E7951UO20111006.
36. Brief for Appellee/Respondents, supra note 35. Id.
37. See, e.g., Brad Reed, Huge Growth Predicted for Mobile Broadband, TECH
WORLD
(Mar. 26, 2009, 10:11 AM), http://news.techworld.com/mobile-wireless/
113385/huge-growth-for-mobile-broadband-predicted/.
38. Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast
Update, 2012-20171-2 (2013).
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region will have the highest growth rate of wireless devices being used
to access mobile networks in the world, with a projected 13-percent
increase between 2012 and 2017.40
As part of the global forecast, Cisco also commissioned a study
lasting nearly three years on the effect of tiered data plan pricing on
the behavior of smartphone owners. 4 1 The percentage of data plans
with fixed tiers, as compared to all other data plans, "increased from 4
percent to 55 percent, while unlimited plans dropped from 81 percent
to 45 percent." 42 The switch was concentrated in the third and fourth
quarters of 2010,43 with the effects gradually inverting the ratio of
unlimited to tiered data plans over the next two years. While one
might expect this to have a limiting effect on the overall amount of
mobile data consumed, the study reached the opposite conclusion:
average usage per device on a tiered plan grew from 425 MB
per month to 922 MB per month, a rate of 117 percent, while
usage per device of unlimited plans grew at a slower rate of 71
percent from a higher base of 738 MB per month to 1.3 GB
per month.44
The authors of the study assume that providers introduced tiered
plans to "constrain the heaviest mobile data users." 45 Judged in light
of this goal, tiered plans have been successful. The heaviest mobile
data users' share of overall data consumption has significantly
decreased. The top one percent of mobile data users accounted for
52 percent of overall traffic in January 2010.46 By September 2012,
traffic usage from the top one percent has dropped to just 16 percent

39. Id., Appendix A at 27 (data sources and methodology of projections) ("The Cisco
VNI methodology begins with the number and growth of connections and devices, applies
adoption rates for applications, and then multiplies the application's user base by Cisco's
estimated minutes of use and KB per minute for that application.")
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 17.
43. See Elizabeth Woyke, Names You Need to Know: Tiered Data Plans, FORBES
(Dec. 9 2010, 10:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2010/12/09/namesyou-need-to-know-tiered-data-plans/. ("AT&T adopted these usage-based plans, which
charge subscribers based on the amount of bandwidth they consume, in early June.
Verizon Wireless added a tiered data plan in late October and T-Mobile USA launched
one in November. Sprint Nextel is the only national U.S. carrier that hasn't adopted tiered
data yet.").
44. Cisco, supra note 38 at 17.
45. Id.
46.

Id.
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of overall consumption.47 Second, the study found that, between
January 2010 and September 2012, the largest increase in mobile data
consumption came from users in the top 20 percent.48 This is welcome
news for providers, who are looking to expand their subscriber base
and prohibit a tiny fraction of users from consuming a
disproportionate amount of mobile data.
However, this trend produces mixed results for independent app
developers. One market research firm study of the third quarter of
2012 concluded that tiered data plans had no significant overall effect
on the rate at which consumers downloaded apps. 49 That same study
concluded that "subscribers in tiered data plans track their usage
more closely,""o which could cause those subscribers to prioritize their
app usage according to data consumption or potentially forego using
data-intensive apps altogether. In any case, independent app
providers are now facing a larger consumer base, albeit, one where
most consumers hold tiered mobile data plans.
C. Current FCC Stance on Mobile Broadband

Although the FCC does pay close attention to mobile broadband
both in its "administrative capacity and as a rhetorical champion,"" it
does not regulate it in the same manner as fixed broadband
connections." In March 2010, the FCC unveiled the National
Broadband Plan (the "Plan"), which announced major upgrades in
the mobile broadband network for providers using LTE and WiMAX
Among other suggested improvements, the Plan
technology."
recommended that the federal government make 500 megahertz of
spectrum available for wireless broadband providers and develop

47. Id.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Tiered Mobile Data Plans Not Inhibiting App Downloads, PARK AND
ASSOCIATES (Oct. 2, 2012), www.parksassociates.com/blog/article/tiered-mobile-dataplans-not-inhibiting-app-downloads.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
"Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, CTIA Wireless 2011" (Mar. 22, 2011) (transcript
at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairmans-prepared-remarks-ctia-wirelessavailable
2011).
52. See, e.g., Grant Gross, Net Neutrality Rules Aren't Strong Enough for Mobile
Broadband, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www.computerworlduk.
com/news/it-business/3307825/net-neutrality-rules-arent-strong-enough-for-mobilebroadband/.
53. Omnibus Broadband Initiative (OBI), Federal Communications Commission,
Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, GN Docket No. 09-51 at 22 (2010).
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performance standards for mobile broadband.54
As Chairman
Genachowski has commented, this would more than double the
amount that was at that time currently available." Those reacting to
the Plan have noted its ambition, but also cautioned against
expecting rapid implementation. 7 One commenter stated that in
order to achieve its stated goals, the Plan "requires a wholesale
reshaping of the regulatory landscape for a diverse set of
telecommunications, media, technology, and broader business
interests." 8
Acting as a spokesman, Chairman Genachowski has touted the
innovation in the mobile broadband sector, noting that mobile
broadband is being adopted faster than any other computing platform
in history" and estimated that app sales will generate $38 billion by
2015.6 In the same speech, Chairman Genachowski stated that the
FCC's then-recently approved Open Internet Rules "recognize the
legitimate differences between wired and wireless technologies,"'
without saying what those differences were and in what sense they are
legitimate. 62
As the FCC's ambitious plan moves toward implementation,
other commissioners have questioned the progress made with regard
to mobile broadband. In May 2011, Commissioner Robert McDowell
strongly criticized the omission of mobile broadband from the FCC's
Seventh Broadband Progress Report, which tracks the progress
towards the Plan's goals, among other matters.63 He blamed the
exclusion of mobile broadband on the failure to specify adequate
technical specifications, remarking that "the Commission should
54. Id. at 43, 47 (Recommendations 4.1 and 4.6).
55. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, "The
Clock is Ticking: Remarks on Broadband" at 6 (Mar. 16, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/genachowski-broadband-clock-ticking).
56. Matt Richtel and Brian Seltzer, F.CC Questioned on Its Far-ReachingPlan to
Expand Broadband Access, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010 at B4, available at
http://www.nytimes .com/2010/03/17/technology/17broadband.html?_r.
57. Id. (quoting telecommunications industry analyst Craig Moffett on the risks that
may limit implementation).
58. Marc S. Martin. The FCC's National Broadband Plan, 66 Bus. LAw. 255, 260
(Nov. 2010).
59. Genachowski, supra note 51, at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id.
63. Seventh Broadband Progress Report and Order on Reconsideration, Fed.
Communications Commission, 26 FCC Rcd. 8008, 8101-2 (May 20, 2011) (dissenting
statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell).
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never have mandated a "one-size-fits-all" definition of broadband." "
While acknowledging the FCC's intention to revise mobile broadband
performance indices in the Plan and other documents, Commissioner
McDowell criticized the current "one-size-fits-all" definition.65
Although the FCC commissioners all agree that mobile broadband is
a crucial part of telecommunications infrastructure and that there
should be more of it available, the process of implementing that
consensus has been slow.6
III. The Verizon-FCC Settlement over Tethering Apps
A. The Structure of the Mobile App Market

When the amount of mobile broadband spectrum is doubled as
promised, it will invite new regulatory questions concerning the rights
of consumers and providers.67 Must providers allow users to access all
lawful applications? What if consumers download an application that
the provider deems a service in disguise? May the provider block it?
If not, may the provider discriminate against its use on the provider's
network? Drawing on the administrative proceedings over tethering
apps and the FCC Open Internet rules, this section of the note
explores the problem of regulating the mobile broadband app market
as exemplified by the FCC-Verizon settlement.
In order to understand the significance of tethering, it is necessary
to situate tethering apps within the broader app market. Dr. Michael
Mandel" explains that the app economy is created by cooperation
among three key sectors: platform designers," telecom providers,"
and third-party software developers."
Platform designers
manufacture the mobile operating system, and oftentimes the phone
64. 26 FCC Rcd. at 8103.
Commissioner McDowell strongly opposed "the
Commission's unwillingness to revisit its arbitrary decision to define broadband as 4 Mbps
downstream and 1 Mbps upstream."
65. Id.
66. Marguerite Reardon, How Politics Inflame the "Spectrum Crisis," SIGNAL
STRENGTH (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-57379526266/how-politics-inflame-the-spectrum-crisis/?tag=mncol;txt.
67. See Robert Bauer, E-Tech Update, 8 No. 1 ABA SCITECH LAW. 30, 31 (Summer
2011) (section titled "Legal Wrestling Begins Over Openness of Cellular Broadband.").
68. Chief Economic Strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute.
69. E.g. Apple and Google.
70. E.g. AT&T and Verizon.
71. Dr. Michael Mandel, What the App Economy Can Teach the Whole Economy,
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2012/02/what-the-app-economy-can-teach-the-whole-economy/253459/ (Examples
of third-party, or independent, developers include Zynga and Instagram).
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that runs the operating system as well." Providers enter into mobile
data service contracts with consumers, allowing them to use their
phones over providers' networks." And third-party developers
"leverage fast networks and advanced mobile devices" to offer
consumers apps that expand the functionality of their devices, ranging
from gaming to commerce to social networking.7 4 One reason for the
rapid growth of the app market is that third parties can use mobile
technologies "in ways their creators never imagined."" To maximize
the potential for innovation, developers should be able to launch
''new applications without the need for support from the network and
thus without the need for permission from the incumbent owners of
network infrastructure." 6 However, in practice platform designers
and providers serve as gatekeepers between independent app
developers and consumers. In order to have any real chance of
economic success, providers and platform designers must consent to
host the apps created by independent developers. Regulators can
help promote innovation by restricting the providers' discretion to
block apps. If either the providers or platform designers create
devices that are too tightly controlled, they risk chilling innovation in
the app market."
B. The Free Press Complaint

Like most major app stores, the Android store pulled tethering
apps in mid-2011.78 In response, Free Press, a media reform
organization, filed an administrative complaint against Verizon on
June 6, 2011, alleging that Google was acting at their request.
According to Free Press, tethering apps "encourage innovation in the
market for wireless devices by providing users with a low-cost, easy

72. Charles M. Davidson and Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the Mobile Moment:
Spectrum Allocation Policy for the Wireless Broadband Century, 19 COMM. LAW
CONSPECTUS 1, 13 (2010).
73. Id. at 10-11.
74. Id. at 13.
75. James Grimmelman & Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative Or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. REV. 910, 911 (2010) (review and criticism of
JONATHAN ZITrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET - AND How TO STOP IT (2008)).
76. Id. at 926.
77. Id. at 936 (discussing Zittrain's argument that centralized control is
fundamentally anti-generative).
78. See Johnston, supra note 12.
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way to try new products and maximize use of their existing devices."7 9
Blocking independent tethering applications, according to the
complaint, both restricts consumer choice and chills innovation."
Tethering apps add a software feature to the customer's smartphone
in the same way as, for instance, an app that uses the phone's built-in
GPS to recommend nearby restaurants." The cellular modem of the
smartphone suffers no harmful additions when a user tethers the
phone to another device. Free Press concludes that blocking a
customer's use of independent tethering apps is unlawful under the
FCC auction rules82 for the section of spectrum that Verizon uses.
Verizon denied this analogy altogether.' In their response to
Free Press, they characterized independent tethering applications as
an attempt to steal a data service." Tethering technology, according
to this view, results in a user receiving two points of access to the
Internet while only paying for one.86 Professor Susan Crawford has
suggested that Verizon's burden to prove that tethering apps
unreasonably interfere with their ability to manage the network is
extremely low.8 If her analysis is correct, then in order to prevail,
Verizon simply needs to establish that their interpretation of the
network management exception is reasonable."
The FCC took notice of the complaint and issued a letter of
inquiry to Verizon on October 12, 2011." The FCC looked into the
circumstances surrounding "Verizon Wireless's request to filter the

79. Complaint of Free Press Against Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless for
Violating Conditions Imposed on C Block of Upper 700 MHz Spectrum, filed June 6,
2011; 47 C.F.R. § 27.16, at 4.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id.
82. For a detailed technical summary of the auction requirements, see Bingham
McCutchen, FCC Releases Full Text of 700 MHz Second Report and Order; Auction to
Begin by January 28, 2008 (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2010/03/FCCNational-Broadband-Plan-Spectrum-Recommendations.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Press Release, Free Press, Verizon Wireless Falls Flat in Response to Free Press
App-Blocking Complaint (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://www.freepress.net/pressrelease/2011/8/8/verizon-wireless-falls-flat-response-free-press-app-blocking-complaint.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Susan P. Crawford, Why Block C Matters (Mar. 20, 2008), http://scrawford.
net/blog/.

88.
89.

Id.
Cellco P'ships d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 27 FCC Rcd. 8932, 8936 (2012).
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tether Applications and the requirement that all customers pay an
additional fee in order to use a tether Application."'
C. The Verizon-FCC Settlement Terms
On July 31, 2012, nearly ten months after the Free Press
complaint, the FCC issued a press release announcing that it had
reached an agreement with Verizon Wireless to settle an
investigation regarding blocking consumer access to tethering apps.91
As part of the settlement agreement, Verizon agreed to pay $1.25
million and to refrain from blocking tethering apps in the future.'
As noted earlier in this article, the FCC has not extended Open
Internet rules to mobile broadband, and so the agency could not
base the investigation into Verizon's activities on that policy.
Instead, the FCC's order rested on the narrower theory that Verizon
had violated the terms of its license agreement. In the FCC Order
enforcing the consent decree, "In the Matter of Cellco Partnership
d/b/a Verizon Wireless"94 ("Order"), the FCC first stipulated that the
license terms for the C-block of wireless spectrum provide that
licensees "shall not deny, limit, or restrict the ability of their
customers to use the devices and Applications of their choice,"95 with
a few narrow exceptions (e.g. apps that interfere with network
management).
Verizon holds a license to operate on the C-block, which it uses to
provide its 4G LTE services. As the licensor, the FCC requires
Verizon to publish best practice guidelines for app developers who
intend to release apps for operation on the C-block.96 The key factual
finding was that, in April 2011, "Verizon Wireless asked an
Application Store Operator to filter from its Application Store eleven
tethering Applications that customers could use to tether without
paying Verizon' Wireless's monthly tethering fee," and the operator
complied." Although the Consent Decree stopped short of drawing
90. Id.
91. Press Release, Federal Communications Comm'n, Verizon Wireless to Pay $1.25
Million to Settle Investigation into Blocking of Consumers' Access to Certain Mobile
Broadband Applications (July 31, 2012) (on file with author).
92. Alan Henry, The Right to Tether: What the Verizon/FCCSettlement Means to You
LIFEHACKER (Aug. 9, 2012), http://lifehacker.com/5933152/the-right-to-tether-what-theverizonfcc-settlement-means-to-you.
93. See supraPart II.c.

94. Cellco P'ships, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8932.
95. Id. at 8936.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the implicit conclusion,9 8 the FCC understood Verizon's action to
constitute a restriction on consumer choice in violation of the C-block
rules. Verizon's Director of Media Relations released a statement
confirming the importance of the communication, claiming that
"[t]his consent decree puts behind us concerns related to an
employee's communication with an app store operator about
tethering applications, and allows us to focus on serving our
customers.""
What exactly the communication said was not
disclosed, and there are no facts in the public record to clarify
whether this single communication was an aberration or part of a
broader pattern or policy of Verizon's. However, the communication
was sufficient to establish a link between Verizon's request and
Google's actions.
D. Licensing Terms as a Substitute for Open Internet Rules

On the day the settlement was announced, FCC Commissioner
Clyburn released a telling statement, noting that "[o]ne of the reasons
the Commission chose, in December 2010, to apply less stringent
Open Internet rules to mobile wireless services was its expectation
that Verizon Wireless's compliance with the openness conditions,
which we imposed on carriers. .. would promote greater consumer
access to mobile applications and services."'" His statement is
notable for the contrast it draws between the mobile and fixed
broadband. The Open Internet rules are not necessary for mobile
broadband, in this view, because the C-block license rules serve a
similar function. This section will begin to assess the validity of that
claim by contrasting the Open Internet rules with the C-block license
restrictions.
The FCC's Open Internet rules, which went into effect on
November 20, 2011,"ol purport to "preserve the Internet as an open

platform enabling consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user
control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without
98. Id. at 8942 (section 21, "Final Settlement"). By its terms, the Consent Decree did
not constitute a legal or factual finding.
99. Brian X. Chen, FCC Forces Verizon to Allow Android Tethering Apps, BITS
BLOG, NYTIMES (July 31, 2012, updated Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://bits.
blogs.nytimes.com/ 2012/07/31/fcc-verizon-tethering/.
100. Mignon L. Clyburn, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission,
Statement of Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn on Announcement of the Enforcement
Bureau Entering into a Consent Decree with Verizon Wireless on Blocking of Access to
Tethering Applications (July 31, 2012) available at www.fcc.gov/document/statementcommissioner-clyburn-verizon-wireless-consent-decree.
101. FCC, Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. §8 (2011).
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The structure of the FCC's Open Internet rules

prohibits providers of fixed-broadband services from blockingro3 and
discrimination,'" insofar as each functions as a restriction on
competition and consumer choice. The prohibition on blocking
forbids providers from restricting customers' choice of apps via a
broader prohibition against providers making any determinations as
to "the type of content [the] customers can access or the device by
which they access it." 05 If applied to the mobile broadband spectrum,
such a rule would protect developers by allowing providers to only
block lawful applications if they interfered with the management of
network traffic, and in that case the provider "[must] publicly disclose
whatever steps they take toward that end."'o
The FCC's Open Internet rules do limit providers' ability to block
applications on mobile broadband, but not in a manner that would
address, much less resolve, the dispute over tethering. The rule
separates fixed and mobile broadband into separate provisions,
mandating that fixed broadband providers may not block any lawful
On the other hand, mobile
content, applications, or services."
broadband providers cannot "block applications that compete with
the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable
network management."'"

Because tethering

apps

cannot be

construed to compete with voice or video telephony services, this rule
does not address the rights of providers and developers with regard to
tethering apps."
The Open Internet rules also prohibit broadband providers from
discriminating against lawful apps."o This regulation concerns "the
speed at which content can be accessed," and effectively prohibits
providers from favoring one form of content over others of the same
kind, with allowances for network management."' The FCC rules
102. 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011).
103. 47 C.F.R. § 8.5 (2011).
104. 47 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2011).
105. Simon Maloy, Understanding the New Internet Freedom Rules, COUNTY FAIR
(Sept. 23, 2011, 12:56 PM ET), http://mediamatters.orgblog/201109230010.
106. Id. (the author suggests that indicia of reasonable network management include
"anything from relieving network congestion to security issues").
107. § 8.5(a).
108. § 8.5(b).
109. Lasar, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that, even if the blocking rule applied the same
standard to the mobile and fixed broadbands, it is unclear whether failure to offer
tethering apps in a provider's app store would constitute blocking).
110. § 8.7.
111. Maloy, supra note 105.

486

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

135:3

state that fixed broadband providers "shall not unreasonably
discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer's
broadband Internet access service."H.2 The regulation omits any
mention of mobile broadband." 3 Reactions to this omission ranged
from outright condemnation from consumer advocacy groupsH4 to
cautious optimism that the omission should not be interpreted as
"blessing discriminatory behavior."115
As Commissioner Clyburn stated, the C-block rules impose
restrictions upon licensees similar to those of the Open Internet rules.
The FCC promulgated the regulations concerning C-block licensees
on October 23, 2007, which provided simply that "[1]icensees offering
service on spectrum subject to this section shall not deny, limit, or
restrict the ability of their customers to use the devices and
application of their choice on the licensee's C Block network.""' The
regulation provides for two exceptions: network management" and
compliance with other statutes and regulations."
IV. Analysis: Do Licensing Terms Effectively Regulate the
Mobile App Market?
To determine if the C-block licensing terms are effective in
regulating the mobile app market, this note will first consider the final
fate of iTether." After being pulled from the App Store for iPhone,
the iTether developers regrouped and, about four months later,
relaunched their product as an HTML5-based app.120 Switching from
a self-contained software app to a code-based app allows users to
download it from Tether's website, effectively bypassing Apple's
112. § 8.7
113. Terzian, supra note 19.
114. See, e.g., Press Release, Free Press, Free Press: FCC Net Neutrality Order a
'Squandered Opportunity' (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.freepress.net/pressrelease/2010/12/21/free-press-fcc-net-neutrality-order-%E2%80%98squanderedopportunity%E2%80%99; Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public Knowledge: FCC Net
Neutrality Order Falls Short (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.public
knowledge.org/public-knowledge-fcc-net-neutrality-order-falls-sh.
115. Barbara van Schewick, The FCC's Open Internet Rules - Stronger than You
Think, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (Dec. 27, 2010, 12:13 AM),

https://netarchitecture.org/2010/12/the-fccE2%80%99s-open-internet-rulesE2%80%
93-stronger-than-you-think/.
116. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(2007).
117. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(1) (2007).
118. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(2) (2007).
119. See supra Section I.
120. Patrick Hankenson, Tether Relaunches iPhone Version, TETHER.COM OFFICIAL
BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012), http://tether.com/tether-relaunches-iphone.
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official app store.12 The product was also rechristened as "Tether,"
conspicuously lacking the signature "i" prefix that denotes Applerelated products. In contrast to similar products in the Android store,
Tether has thus far been successfully blocked from the Apple store.
Why was Apple able to block Tether while Verizon (via Google)
was stopped from engaging in the same behavior? In theory there
should be no inconsistency of results here-Verizon and AT&T both
won licenses to the same band of wireless spectrum at the same
auction,'22 and both licenses are subject to the prohibition on limiting
customer choice in section 27.16(b).123 If that regulation was sufficient
to prohibit Verizon from pulling tethering apps from the Android
store, why was the same result not achieved in iTether's case?
The difficulty lies in the link between providers and platform
designers. 124 Platform designers, who often also manufacture and sell
the smartphones that run their operating systems, are not subject to
either the Open Internet rules or the C-block license restrictions.
Thus, they have greater freedom to block or discriminate in the areas
expressly under their control. App stores are one such area where
platform designers enjoy almost total control. Platform designers
work with providers on the technical requirements to ensure that
apps hosted on, say, the Apple or Android app stores are adequately
supported on Verizon and AT&T's networks. But platform designers
do not fall under the FCC's regulatory authority as either providers
or licensees.
This distinction means that Apple can engage in blocking on its
own initiative, but if it does so on AT&T's behalf, AT&T will be
liable. The key difference between Tether in the Apple App Store
and Verizon's request to block tethering apps seems to be that the
FCC was able to establish that Verizon had directed Google to block
tethering apps."' This provided the crucial link between the platform
designer's behavior on the app store and the provider's legal
obligations to refrain from blocking. In the Verizon case, the FCC
chose to address future violations by mandating compliance reports

121. Andrew Tarantola, iTether is Back, Bypassing Hot Spot Restrictions and the App
Store, GIZMODO (Mar. 10, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5892137/itether-is-back-bypassinghotspot-restrictions-and-the-app-store.

122. See Verizon, AT&T win FCC auction, Google wins open spectrum, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 20, 2008 (available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iMbs
PSv2vatAVvbz _8nOxU3Mfvnw).
123. Cellco P'ships, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8936.
124. See supra Part III.A, "The Structure of the Mobile App Market."
125. See Cellco P'ships, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8936; Chen, supra note 99.
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from Verizon including, among other things, "a list of all Applications
that have been removed or filtered from Application Stores in
response to Application Store Communications between the Effective
Date and the date of the Compliance Report, along with a brief
explanation of the reason(s) Verizon Wireless requested removal or
filtering." 12 6 This disclosure requirement effectively stops Verizon
from deciding which tethering apps users may download, assuming
that the platform designers with which Verizon partners do not block
apps on their own initiative.
As a practical matter, the FCC faces a high burden under the
current regulatory scheme to establish a causal link between provider
requests and platform designer blocking for any given app that is
pulled from a major app store. And platform designers, not
providers, are the most common culprits when it comes to blocking
apps. As the owner and operator of the most popular app stores,
platform designers serve as the primary gatekeeper for consumer
access to apps and may block apps from consumers by simply refusing
to host them in their app stores. While the FCC found a smoking gun
in the form of a direct communication between Verizon and Google,
cementing their case in the settlement, it would be naYve to suppose
that future attempts at blocking will be quite so obvious. Perhaps
platform designers can design technical requirements for app hosting
with input from providers that exclude certain types of apps. There
are many ways to block an app without the simple request to block
that Verizon sent to Google. The real regulatory issue is whether it
should matter at all which entity actually blocks mobile apps.
Insofar as promoting innovation in the app market is the FCC's
policy goal,'27 blocking should not be permitted, either by providers or
platform designers. As scholar Barbara van Schewick has argued,
innovators should not need permission from providers or platform
designers to develop new apps, arguing that "adding additional
decision makers who need to endorse the idea or take action before
an idea can be realized reduces the chances that innovative ideas can

126. Cellco P'ships, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8939 (emphasis added).
127. See Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality: What a Non-DiscriminationRule
Should Look Like (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1684677), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1684677
(arguing that innovator
choice and user choice are two significant factors that have fostered app innovation in the
past).
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be realized." 2 8 In her book Internet Architecture and Innovation, van
Sckewick presents the following analysis of how user choice works in
the app market:
In the current Internet, it is impossible to predict what future
Enabling widespread
successful applications will be.
experimentation at the application-level and enabling users to
choose the applications they prefer is at the heart of the
mechanism that enables innovation under uncertainty to be
successful. By singling out specific applications, network
providers start picking winners and losers on the Internet.'29
Network providers, van Schewick goes on to argue, are
historically bad at picking the right winners, in large part because they
are motivated by an entirely different set of concerns than third party
developers.3 o She concludes that "consumers, not network providers,
should continue to choose winners and losers on the Internet.""'
Prior to the major providers removing independent tethering apps
from their app stores,132 consumers were in a position to determine
which apps provided the most value.133 Regardless of whether
providers or platform designers chose to restrict the access and use of
independent tethering apps, the result is that consumers were
deprived of the ability to test different applications and allow
innovators to compete with one another.'34
The inconsistent treatment of tethering apps shows that platform
designers are part of that process, and can just as easily usurp the
consumers' role in picking winners and losers. But unlike providers,
platform designers are not subject to Open Internet rules or C-block
licensee restrictions, placing them outside the reach of the FCC's
authority.
This note is intended to be a diagnosis of the problem rather than
a proposal for the solution, but it is clear from the diagnosis that any
attempt to rectify blocking in the mobile app market must constrain
128. Letter from Barbara van Schewick, Associate Professor of Law and (by courtesy)
Electrical Engineering, Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed.
Communications Comm'n. (Dec. 9,2010) (on file with the Stanford Law School Library).
129.

(2010).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

BARBARA

VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 8

Id.
Id.
E.g., Isaac, supra note 11.
Id.
van Schewick, supra note 127.
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the behavior of both providers and platform designers. Any solution
to this problem may require participation from regulators other than
the FCC or additional legislation from Congress that grants the FCC
the necessary authority.
V. Conclusion
As the mobile broadband occupies a larger portion of total
Internet users and technological barriers between mobile and fixed
broadband dissolve, providers, platform designers, independent
developers, and consumers will all benefit from a clear set of rules.
To serve the goals of the Open Internet policy, such rules must
maximize innovation to the benefit of developers and consumers
while allowing providers the tools to provide high-quality service at
competitive prices.135 Achieving the right balance will not be easy, but
the recent events surrounding tethering apps demonstrate a need for
more effective regulation of mobile broadband. 31 6 While the FCC
continues to regard the mobile spectrum as a sui generis area of
broadband that remains too nascent and complex for robust
regulation, software companies that bet their business on developing
the next great tethering app have been frustrated by provider and
platform designer discriminationl37 as well as blocking.3 8 The current
Open Internet Rules, while laudable in many respects, fail to
adequately address the situation.'39
Faced with a situation of provider-initiated blocking of mobile
apps, the FCC looked to restrictions on the use of the C-block
spectrum, which contained a related restriction on user choice.'40 The
FCC was able to establish that Google, the platform designer, had
blocked tethering apps from its Android store at Verizon's request,
which prompted the parties to settle. 4' But if the facts were slightly
different and the platform designers alone were responsible for the
blocking, the FCC would have been powerless to stop them. From
the standpoint of promoting innovation and consumer choice, neither
providers nor platform designers should be allowed to usurp the
consumers' role in selecting the best apps on the market. Any

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011).
Lasar, supra note 13.
Gurman, supra note 1.
Johnston, supra note 12.
Free Press, supra note 84.
Federal Communications Comm'n, supra note 91.
Cellco P'ships, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8936.
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attempt to address this problem, therefore, must take into account
both providers and platform designers. Only then will the regulations
accurately reflect how blocking occurs in the current market and help
the next iTether reach consumers without interference.
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In the Heat of the Law, It's Not just Steam: Geothermal Resources
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- Donald 1.Kochan and Tiffany Grant
From WNW Volume 12, Number 1:
Coast Salish Property Law: An Alternative Paradigm for
Environmental Relationships
-

Russel Lawrence Barsh

From WNW Volume 11, Number 2:
The Plain "Dam!" Language of Fish & Game Code Section 5937:
How California's Clearest Statute Has Been Diverted From Its
Legislative Mandate - Robert Firpo
From WNW Volume 11, Number 1:
The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater
-John D. Leshy
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Dividing the Waters: The California Experience - Brian E. Gray
A Brief Examination of the History of the Persistent Debate About
Limits to Western Growth - Dan Tarlock
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of essays,
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half-century career. He is in a unique position - from
Daniel's
decades of covering the most influential stories of our lifetime - to provide insight in the
evolution of modem American journalism as well as a rare look at himself, the man behind
the news story, one of modem journalism's founding fathers.
Vietnam and Watergate, the Cold War, national and international politics - literally the
biggest stories of our times - has been Daniel Schorr's "beat." Forgive Us OurPress
Passes contains Daniel Schorr's reflections on the role of media in society, the effects of
television on the development of the j oumalistic craft, privacy and secrecy, the First
Amendment, and government suppression of information.
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Hastings College of the Law:
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by Thomas Garden Barnes

This centennial celebration
of Hastings College of the
Law, published in 1978 at the
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of an extraordinary instituttion, born in pre-Gold Rush
San Francisco,. It is the story
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